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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DOUGLAS REED JONES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900042-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea to the charge of distribution of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the record as a whole establishes that

defendant entered his guilty plea voluntarily?

An appellate

court "will not interfere with a trial judge's determination that
a defendant has failed to show good cause [for withdrawal of a
guilty plea] unless it clearly appears that the trial judge
abused his discretion."

State v. Mildenhallf 747 P.2d 422, 424

(Utah 1987).
2.

Whether the record as a whole establishes that the

judge made the necessary findings with respect to defendant's
guilty plea?

Icl. at 424 (same standard as above).

3.

Whether the record as a whole establishes that the

judge made adequate inquiry into defendant's mental status?

Id.

at 424 (same standard as above).
4.

Whether the judge properly advised defendant that

by pleading guilty he waived his right to cross-examine his
accusers?

Ld. at 424 (same standard as above).
5.

Whether the judge in determining voluntariness was

required to review a possible affirmative defense?

J*!'

at

424

(same standard as above).
6.

Whether the judge properly advised defendant of the

time period for a request to withdraw a guilty plea?

^d. at 424

(same standard as above).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The relevant provisions relied upon by the State are
set forth in the argument section of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution
of a controlled substance, both second degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) and
one count of being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 7-10).

Pursuant to a plea bargain

agreement, defendant pled guilty on October 31, 1989 to one count
of distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding (Tl.

-2-

7).

On December 18, 1989, Judge Noel heard defendant's motion

to withdraw his guilty plea (T2. 3). After a hearing, Judge Noel
denied defendant's motion (T2. 48-50).

Judge Noel sentenced

defendant on January 9, 1990, to serve a term of one to fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison (R. 113).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to the information, defendant sold cocaine to
a police informant on December 11, 1987 and December 22, 1987 (R.
7-8).

Because defendant had previously been convicted of

unrelated crimes, the information also charged defendant with
being a habitual criminal (R. 8-9).
On December 12, 1988, a preliminary hearing was held
and defendant was bound over for trial.

Defendant informed the

court that he intended to rely on an entrapment defense (R. 6162).

An entrapment hearing was scheduled for August 16, 1989 (R.

78).

At the hearing, the State made a motion to have defendant's

attorney disqualified, since the attorney had previously
represented the police informant in another criminal matter.
Id.

Defense counsel subsequently withdrew and new counsel was

appointed (R. 80, 82).

The transcript from the the guilty plea hearing is designated
"Tl." The transcript from the hearing to withdraw the guilty
plea is designated MT2." The record is designated "R."
2
The preliminary hearing transcript has not been made part of
the record on appeal.
The transcript of this hearing has not been made part of the
record on appeal.
-3-

The entrapment hearing was rescheduled for October 31,
4
1989 (Tl. 1). On that date, defense counsel informed the trial
court that a resolution of the case had been reached.

Id.

Defendant would plead guilty to one count of distribution of a
controlled substance.

Jd.

In return, the State would dismiss

the other two counts and would not charge defendant with any
other crimes arising out of the investigation (Tl. 1, 6).
Judge Noel went through the process of taking
defendant's guilty plea.

The judge started by asking defendant

if he had reviewed the guilty plea affidavit with his counsel
(Tl. 1) (See Appendix "A"; Statement of Defendant).

Defendant

indicated both that counsel had read the affidavit to him and
that he had read the affidavit himself, ^d.

In response to a

follow-up question, defendant indicated he understood the
affidavit "perfectly" (Tl. 2). In response to a series of
questions from the bench, defendant told the court he knew he was
giving up certain constitutional rights, including his right to a
jury trial, his right to confront witnesses against him, his
right to present his own evidence, and his alternative rights to
either take the stand to testify on his own behalf or remain
silent without being forced to testify.

Ld.

Defendant also

stated, in response to questioning, that he understood that the
State would be forced to prove its case without forcing defendant
to testify.

Id.

The record indicates that the hearing was originally scheduled
for October 10, 1989 (R. 86). The record is silent as to why the
hearing actually occurred three weeks later.
-4-

Judge Noel asked defendant if he understood that by
pleading guilty he was waiving his right to appeal and "all of
these constitutional rights we just discussed" (Tl. 2-3).
Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." (Tl. 3). The judge asked
defendant to sign the plea affidavit (Tl. 3). Defendant agreed
to do so.

Ixi. At that point, defense counsel interjected

herself into the judge's colloquy with defendant by stating, "Let
me remind the court we must advise Mr. Jones about his rijgjit to
withdraw his guilty plea.

It is good for only 30 days."

Id.

After defendant signed the plea affidavit, Judge Noel
reviewed the affidavit with him.

First, the judge ensured that

the affidavit accurately reflected defendant's age and
educational background.
Id.

Ld.

Defendant affirmed that it did.

Next, Judge Noel asked if defendant understood the penalty

for committing a second degree felony and that he could order the
sentence to run either concurrently or consecutively with other
sentences

(Tl. 3-4). Once again, defendant gave an appropriate

response (Tl. 4). In response to another question, defendant
acknowledged that the judge was not bound by any recommendations
with regard to sentencing.

Id.

Judge Noel summarized the offense charged in the
information, setting forth the elements of distributing a
controlled substance, and asked defendant if he understood those
elements,

j^i. Once again, defendant responded appropriately.

The judge asked defendant if he understood that by pleading
guilty, the State would not be obligated to prove any of those
elements,

^d.

Defendant responded affirmatively.

-5-

Id.

After discussing the statutory elements of distribution
of a controlled substance, Judge Noel asked defendant if he
agreed with and admitted to the facts alleged in the complaint
that defendant, on December 11, 1987, in Salt Lake County, had
sold one quarter of an ounce of cocaine to an undercover
narcotics agent for $425 (Tl. 5). Defendant agreed that he had.
Id.

Defendant then waived a reading of the information.

Id.

Judge Noel asked defendant how he pled to the crime charged^. Id.
Defendant responded, "Guilty."

Id.

Judge Noel asked defendant if he was entering the plea
voluntarily, without force from any other person, and without any
promises other than those contained in the guilty plea affidavit.
(Tl. 5-6). Once again, defendant responded appropriately to all
questions.

I^i. The judge asked defendant if he was under the

influence of alcohol or drugs of any kind (Tl. 6). Defendant
answered no.

Id..

The judge asked defendant if he had any

questions to ask the court.

Id.

Defendant indicated he did not.

Id.
Defense counsel interrupted at that point to say that
the State had agreed not to file any additional charges as the
result of the investigation.

Jd.

Judge Noel confirmed with the

prosecutor that that was the agreement and asked defendant if he
understood the agreement.

Id.

Defendant responded that he did

(Tl. 7).
Judge Noel then made an oral finding that "the plea has
been freely and voluntarily made by the defendant."

Id.

He went

on to ask two more questions of defendant, "I will advise you,

-6-

Mr. Jones, that if you intend to ask this court to allow you to
withdraw this guilty plea that request must be made within 30
days; do you understand that?"
responded "yes,"

j ^ . To which, defendant

I<i. Defendant's response was followed by a

final question, "Your attorney has also mentioned [withdrawal of
guilty pleas] here in court today, and I assume you discussed
that with her?"

Id.. Defendant responded that he had.

Id.

Judge Noel and counsel then discussed sentencing (Tl.
7-8).

During this discussion, defense counsel proffered

defendant's concern about the conduct of the confidential
informant (Tl. 8).
On November 16, 1989, defendant filed a motion to set
aside the guilty plea (R. 101). Judge Noel heard defendant's
motion on December 16, 1989 (T2. 3). After a hearing, including
testimony by defendant, Judge Noel denied defendant's motion (T2.
5-31, 49-50).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered.

The court made a detailed inquiry into whether

defendant's plea was voluntary, giving both defendant and defense
counsel an opportunity to consult and place objections on the
record.

The record as a whole, including the plea affidavit,

comported with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Defendant's reliance on a strict compliance test is misplaced
where the Utah Supreme Court has continued to apply a record as a
whole test.

-7-

Specifically, the trial court made proper findings that
defendant willingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas.
Both the colloquy between defendant and the trial court and the
plea affidavit demonstrate the voluntary nature of defendant's
guilty plea.
The trial court did not err in referring to defendant's
right to "confront," as opposed to "cross examine," his accusers
because the right to confrontation includes the right to crossexamination.

The record as a whole shows defendant's

understanding of that right, particularly in light of language
contained in the plea affidavit which uses the terms together.
By pleading guilty, defendant waived his affirmative
defense of entrapment and the trial court had no duty to explore
his defense with him.

Pleading guilty waives all non-

jurisdictional defects in the plea process. An affirmative
defense is not a jurisdictional defect.
Finally, the trial court properly advised defendant of
his right to withdraw his guilty plea.

Defense counsel's

misinformation should be disregarded as invited error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY.
Defendant claims that his guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered because the trial court did not:

(1) make

appropriate findings under Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, (2) explore defendant's mental condition, (3)
tell defendant he had the right to cross-examine his accusers.

-8-

(4) explore the affirmative defense of entrapment with defendant,
and (5) tell defendant that withdrawal of guilty pleas was within
the sound discretion of the court.

Each of these assertions is

without merit and will be discussed in turn.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1990) provides that a
"plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown
and with leave of court."

An appellate court "will not interfere

with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has failed to
show good cause unless it clearly appears that the trial judge
abused his discretion."

State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424

(Utah 1987) .
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets
forth the procedures to be followed in entering a guilty plea:
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest, and may not accept the
plea until the court has found: . . .
(d) the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements.
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him
for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). 5
Defendant maintains that strict and not just
substantial compliance with Rule 11 is required and any technical
In 1989, the subsections in Utah R. Crim. P. 11 and Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-11 were redesignated so that the former Rule 11(e)
and § 77-35-ll(e) are now Rule 11(5) and § 77-35-11(5). See 1989
Utah Laws, ch. 62, § 2. Section 77-35-11 was repealed effective
July 1, 1990. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (Supp. 1989).
-9-

failure to comply with Rule 11 necessitates setting aside the
guilty plea.

Defendant relies on State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309

(Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Rule 11
squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered."

jrd. at 1312.

This Court's decisions in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756
P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988), and
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam), support defendant's position that strict compliance with
Rule 11 is required.

In Vasilacopulos, this Court interpreted

the Supreme Court's decision in Gibbons to have "effectively
replaced the prior 'record as a whole' test with a strict Rule
11(e) compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty plea."
Vasilacopulos, 776 P.2d at 94. However, Vasilacopulos and
Valencia are inconsistent with recent decisions by the Utah
Supreme Court and should be disavowed.
Recently, in Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah
1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990), the Utah Supreme
Court found that although the trial court did not strictly comply
with Rule 11 when Jolivet entered his plea, "'the absence of a
finding under [section 77-35-11] is not critical so long as the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of the
consequences and of the rights he was waiving.'"

Jolivet# 784

P.2d at 1149-50 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1986) and citing Brooks v. Morris# 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985);
Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985)).
-10-

Prior to Jolivet, the Utah Supreme Court also applied
the record as a whole test in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266
(Utah 1988), stating:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[Tjhere is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy fv. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470
(1969)] (emphasis in original). We think the
most effective way to do this is to have a
defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness.
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Copeland clearly states that strict Rule 11 compliance is not
absolutely required when a guilty plea is otherwise voluntary.
Id.

Thus, substantial compliance is sufficient where the record

establishes that the defendant pled voluntarily.

See also State

v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 1986) (technical Rule 11
violations do not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary
plea).

Gibbons simply recommends the best method of determining

the voluntariness of a plea, but does not impose a strict
compliance test.
This Court recently applied the record as a whole test
to a post-Gibbons guilty plea, citing to, inter alia, Copeland,
Jolivet, and Kay.
Ct. App. 1989).

State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah

Thurston does not acknowledge either

-11-

Vasilacopulos or Valencia, nor cite to Gibbons. Apparently, at
least one panel of this Court has abandoned the strict compliance
rule articulated in Vasilacopulos and Valencia,

The Thurston

Court correctly described the test as whether the record as a
whole establishes that the plea was entered "with full knowledge
and understanding of its consequences, and the rights [defendant]
is waiving."

Thurston, 781 P.2d at 1301.

It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent
cases where the Utah Supreme Court was applying the record as a
whole test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was
decided.

This argument gains some support from the Supreme

Court's recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on
the theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break from the
past and consequently not retroactive.

State v. Hickman, 779

P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per curiam).
Hickman, while somewhat troubling, is not
determinative.

First, Hickman is a per curiam decision which

ignores that the Supreme Court applied the record as a whole test
in Jolivet without distinguishing the case on the basis that it
was a pre-Gibbons plea.

Second, in Copeland, the Supreme Court

did not even cite Gibbons, which suggests that the Court was not
concerned that Gibbons might be inconsistent with the Copeland
holding.

Notably, the Jolivet Court did not state the date of

Jolivet's plea and Copeland only mentioned in passing the date of
Copeland's plea without assigning any particular significance to

Hickman predates Jolivet since Hickman was issued August 17,
1989 and Jolivet was issued August 22, 1989.
-12-

the date.

The Utah Supreme Court's willingness to apply the

record as a whole test in Jolivet and Copeland without further
explanation indicates that the test is voluntariness, not strict
Rule 11 compliance, regardless of whether a pre- or post-Gibbons
plea is in issue.

Finally, were it otherwise, it seems Miller,

Kay, Brooks, and Warner would be specifically overruled or
limited in their application to pre-Gibbons cases.

Since these

cases have neither been overruled nor limited, the record as a
whole approach seems applicable in both pre- and post-Gibbons
cases, as it logically should.
Applying the record as a whole standard in the present
case, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Before accepting

the plea, the trial judge and defendant entered into the
following colloquy:
The Court:

You are Douglas Reed Jones?

The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Mr. Jones, have you reviewed a statement
with your attorney here today?
The defendant:
it myself.

Yes, sir, she read it to me and I read

The Court: You understand that that lists certain
constitutional rights you have in connection with these
proceedings. Did you discuss those?
The defendant:

Yes, I did.

The Court: You understand then that you have a right
to a jury trial on these charges?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: You have the right to confront any
witnesses presented against you by the State?

-13-

The defendant:
The Court:
your own?

Yes, sir.

You have the right to present evidence of

The defendant: Yes.
The Court: You would also have the right to take the
stand and testify on your own behalf, or you would also
have the right to remain silent and could not be forced
to testify?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: . The State would be required to prove their
case without any testimony from you, do you understand
that?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: If you were convicted of these charges, you
would have the right to appeal that conviction. If you
plead guilty today you'll give up all of these
Constitutional rights we just discussed; are you aware
of that?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Are you willing to sign the statement?
The defendant:
The Court:

Yes, sir.

Would you do so at this time?

Ms. Mower [defense counsel]: Let me remind the Court
we must advise Mr. Jones about his right to withdraw
his guilty plea. It is good for only 30 days.
The Court:

Certainly, I intend to do that.

Ms. Mower: Perhaps the record should reflect I'm
dating it for Mr. Jones, and Miss Huffnagle [the
prosecutor] and I have previously signed the affidavit.
The Court: All right, Mr. Jones, this statement that
you've just signed indicates that you're 34 years of
age and completed 13 years of schooling; is that
correct?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: You've been charged with a second degree
felony. Do you understand that carries a penalty from
one to [15] years in the Utah State Prison and up to a
$10,000 fine, plus 25 percent surcharge?
-14-

The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Now, do you also understand that the Court
could impose that sentence and require that it run
consecutive to any other sentence that you might now be
serving?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: There will probably be recommendations made
to this Court with regard to sentencing, but you
understand the Court is not bound by any recommendation
and could require that that sentence run consecutive
[sic]?
The defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: The elements of this offense with which
you've been charged are that you intentionally
distributed a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine.
In order for you to be convicted of this offense, the
State would be required to provide each and everyone
[sic] of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Do
you understand that?
The defendant: Yes.
The Court: However, if you plead guilty today the
State will not be required to make that proof, you'll
be convicted of that charge by your own admission; do
you understand that?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: They allege as facts to support this charge
on December 11, 1987, you sold one quarter ounce of
cocaine to an undercover narcotics agent for $425.00,
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Do you understand that if you
plead guilty you'll be admitting those facts?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Do you waive formal reading of the
information, counsel?
Ms. Mower:

We would.

The Court: You've been charged under Count One with
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting
or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance, a second degree felony, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about are (sic) December 11, 1987,
to wit, cocaine. How do you plead to that charge?
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The defendant:

Guilty.

The Court: Are you entering that plea voluntarily?
The defendant:
The Court:

Yes, sir.

Nobody is forcing you to do so?

The defendant: No.
The Court: Has anybody made any promises to you as to
what the sentence of the court might be?
The defendant:

Only what the paper said.

Th£ Courl:: And that is—let me just take a look at it.
The defendant: They would recommend Counts Two and
Three were [sic] dropped, that was all.
The Court:

Okay.

Ms. Mower:

That's correct.

The Court: The only representation that's been made if
you plead guilty is then the other charges will be
dropped?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Mr. Jones, are you presently under the
influence of any alcohol or drugs of any kind?
The defendant: No.
The Court: Do you have any questions whatsoever about
these proceedings that you want to ask the Court?
The defendant:

No, sir.

Ms. Mower: Your honor, we have one addendum to that
plea bargain. The State would also agree not to file
any additional charges which it could have brought as a
result of this investigation. There's a potential, I
believe, of one or perhaps two other charges. Those
will not be filed, but they arise out of this
investigation with this informant.
The Court:

Is that correct?

Ms. Huffnagle:
The Court:

That's correct.

Do you understand that, Mr. Jones?
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The defendant:

Yes, I understand.

The Court: The Court finds that the plea has been
freely and voluntarily made by the defendant. The
Court will sign the statement so indicating. And I
will advise you, Mr. Jones, that if you intend to ask
this Court to allow you to withdraw this guilty plea
that request must be made within 30 days; do you
understand that?
The defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: All right.
(Tl. 1-7). 7
The plea affidavit executed by defendant also contains
the various constitutional rights waived by defendant's guilty
plea, as well as the same information secured by Judge Noel in
his colloquy with defendant. (See Appendix "A"; Statement of
Defendant).

The record as a whole shows not only compliance with

Rule 11, but a conscientious effort by the Judge Noel to ensure
that defendant knew the consequences of pleading guilty to the
crime charged.
POINT II
THE JUDGEG MADE PROPER FINDINGS.
Defendant claims the trial court did not make proper
findings as required by Rule 11. Defendant's claim should be
summarily rejected.
Defendant cites Gibbons for the proposition that "Rule
11(e) squarely places on trial Courts the burden of ensuring that
Constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered."

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. Likewise,

7
The State maintains that even if this Court uses a strict
compliance test, the on the record colloquy between defendant and
Judge Noel shows strict compliance with Rule 11.
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defendant cites Valencia for the statement that "[s]trict, and
not just substantial compliance with the rule is required."
o

Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334. However, the Gibbons and Valencia
quotes are taken out context.

Taken in context, both quotes

require that the defendant fully understand his rights waived by
a guilty plea, but do not require specific findings by the trial
judge on each right.
As the Utah Supreme Court said in Jolivet,

" ' the..

absence of a finding under [section 77-35-11] is not critical so
long as the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding
of its consequences and the rights he was waiving.'"

Jolivet,

784 P.2d at 1149 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405
(Utah 1986) and citing Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah
1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985)).
Defendant claims the only finding made by Judge Noel
was "that the plea has been freely and voluntarily made by
defendant" (Tl. 7). However, this misstates the facts.

The

entire colloquy as well as the plea affidavit served as a basis
for ensuring defendant knew what rights he was waiving, the
elements and factual allegations of the crime defendant had been
charged with, and that defendant made his plea of his own
volition.

By asking each question, Judge Noel followed Rule 11

procedure in satisfying himself that defendant knew the
consequences of his plea.

The judge's questioning sets forth not

p

The State repeats its assertion that Valencia has limited
viability since the decision misinterpreted Gibbons. See Point
I, supra.
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only the elements of the crime for which defendant was charged,
but also summarized the specific acts defendant was accused of
committing.

See State v. Copeland# 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah

1988) (approving of a trial judge's explanation to the defendant
setting forth both the elements of the crime and defendant's
criminal conduct).

The plea affidavit also establishes that

defendant entered the plea voluntarily (R. 93). (See Appendix
"A"; Statement of Defendant).

Based upon the affidavit and

colloquy, Judge Noel found the guilty plea freely and voluntarily
made (R. 98). Thus the requirements for a voluntary guilty plea
have been met.
POINT III
THE JUDGE MADE SUFFICIENT INQUIRY INTO
DEFENDANT'S MENTAL STATE AT THE TIME HE
ACCEPTED DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA.
Defendant claims that Judge Noel should have asked
defendant whether he was suffering from any mental disease or
defect which would impair his ability to make a knowing and
voluntary guilty plea.

Defendant's claim is without substance.

Notably, defendant cites no authority for his claim
that the trial judge is required to inquire into a defendant's
mental status at the time of a guilty plea.

Rule 11 only

requires that "the plea is voluntarily made."
11(5)(b).

Utah R. Crim. P.

In any event, by asking defendant if he was under the

influence of drugs or alcohol, Judge Noel assured himself that
defendant was mentally aware of the plea proceedings.
Defendant further claims that the judge should have
known about defendant's placement in an isolation cell and should
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have questioned him about it. However, nothing in the record
indicates Judge Noel knew defendant was in isolation at the time
defendant entered his guilty plea.

Either defendant or counsel

could have mentioned the isolation status to the judge at the
time defendant entered his guilty plea.

Neither did.

The plea

affidavit includes defense counsel's certification that she
believed defendant was both physically and mentally competent to
understand the meaning of the contents of the affidavit (R. 97)
(See Appendix "A", Statement of Defendant).

Defense counsel

should not be allowed to portray defendant as mentally competent
at the time the plea is entered and later claim incompetence in
an attempt to renege on the plea bargain agreement.
In any event, Judge Noel rejected defendant's selfserving testimony that the plea was involuntary because defendant
was allegedly confused, downhearted, and depressed (T2. 48-50).
These symptoms are not surprising in light of the serious trouble
defendant was in at the time of the plea.

If these alleged

symptoms alone are sufficient grounds to set aside an otherwise
voluntary guilty plea, there would be few sustainable guilty
pleas.
POINT IV
THE JUDGE PROPERLY INFORMED DEFENDANT ABOUT
HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
Defendant claims that the judge did not tell him of his
right to "cross-examine" his accusers.

This claim has no merit.

Courts have long held that the right to confrontation
includes the right of cross-examination.

As the United States

Supreme Court has stated, "The main purpose of the confrontation
-20-

is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination. - Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)
(quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940))
(emphasis in original).
673, 678 (1986).

Accord Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

See also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418

(1965).
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed that the right of
cross-examination is included in the confrontation clauses of
both the United States and Utah Constitutions.
564 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1977).
P.2d 264, 271 (Utah 1985).

State v. Maestas,

See also State v. Hyqh, 711

As the Utah Supreme Court said in

another case, "Certainly, disallowing a criminal defendant a fair
opportunity to expose a witness' bias or motivation in testifying
may infringe upon the defendant's constitutionally protected
right of confrontation."

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204

(Utah 1987).
In the present case, the record clearly establishes
that defendant was informed of his confrontation rights.
Defendant's plea affidavit states, "I know that if I wish to have
a trial I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney" (R. 94)
(See Appendix "A"; Statement of Defendant) (emphasis added).
This statement alone shows that defendant knew he was waiving his
right to cross-examine his accusers.
Additionally, the on-the-record colloquy also shows
defendant's understanding of this right. At the guilty plea
hearing, Judge Noel asked, "You have the right to confront any
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witnesses presented against you by the state?"

To which

defendant responded, "Yes, sir." (Tl. 2). While the judge's
question does not specifically mention the word "cross-examine,"
the absence of this word is a distinction without a difference.
POINT V
THE JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO INFORM
DEFENDANT THAT BY PLEADING GUILTY HE WAS
WAIVING HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
ENTRAPMENT.
Defendant next complains that Judge Noel should-have
inquired about his entrapment defense.

Since no such inquiry is

required, no error occurred and defendant's claim should be
rejected.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea
waives all non-jurisdictional defects and admits all of the
essential elements of the crime.
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989).

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d

Likewise, the United States Supreme

Court has held that a defendant is precluded from alleging denial
of constitutional rights which occurred prior to the entry of a
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea.
U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

Tollett v. Henderson, 411

In this case, entrapment is an affirmative

defense which is statutorily provided for under Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-303(1) (Supp. 1989).

As the Supreme Court said in Tollett:

When a criminal defendant has solemnly
admitted in open court that he is in fact
guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty
plea. He may only attack the voluntary and
the intelligent character of the guilty plea
by showing that the advice he received from
counsel was not within the standards set
-22-

forth in McMann [v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
770 (1970)].
Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. £f. United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d
715, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965) (a
plea of guilty is an admission of guilt and a waiver of all
nonjurisdictional defects).

See also United States v. DePolif

628 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Lopez, 704 F.2d
1382 (5th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983); State v.
Sery, -758. P. 2d 935-, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Some courts have permitted a defendant to avoid the
waiver doctrine by allowing a defendant to enter a conditional
guilty plea expressly preserving specific issues for appeal with
the consent of the judge and prosecutor.

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d

935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); People v. Reid, 420 Mich. 326, 362
N.W.2d 655 (1984); State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).

A

conditional plea nullifies the general rule of waiver and allows
a defendant to withdraw his plea in the event he is successful on
appeal.

Sery, 758 P.2d at 938.

In the instant case, defendant did not enter a
9
conditional guilty plea.
Defense counsel told the court, "It's
our intent to enter a plea to count one as charged in the
information, that would be distribution of a controlled
substance.

And upon the taking of our plea, the State would move

to dismiss count two and count three" (Tl. 1). The only
"condition" apparent in defense counsel's statement is that the
9
If defendant was concerned about his entrapment defense,
nothing in the record indicates why he could not have proceeded
with the entrapment hearing before pleading guilty. Waiving the
entrapment hearing by pleading guilty was defendant's choice.
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State would dismiss the other two counts against defendant.
Defendant misstates the record when he claims that
defense counsel brought the issue to the court's attention at the
time of the plea (Br. of App. at 18-19).

In fact, a close

reading of the record indicates that defense counsel first
mentioned the entrapment defense after Judge Noel accepted the
guilty plea.

Defense counsel then changed the subject to discuss

sentencing (Tl. 7). All of defense counsel's statements relied
upon by defendant go to the sentence the court might impose, not
the nature of defendant's guilty plea.
Noticeably, defendant fails to cite any authority which
requires a judge to notify a defendant that all affirmative
defenses are waived by an unconditional guilty plea.

Such a

requirement could place an impossible burden on the court to
discover possible defenses just to inform the defendant that they
will become moot by the guilty plea.

In any event, the record is

clear that defendant was aware of his possible entrapment defense
since he chose to forego the entrapment hearing in order to plead
guilty.

Since the plea was voluntary, this Court should allow it

to stand.

During the plea process, defense counsel and the prosecutor
also agreed, and defendant acknowledged understanding, that the
State would file no additional charges as a result of its
investigation (Tl. 6).
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POINT VI
THE JUDGE PROPERLY INFORMED DEFENDANT OF THE
TIME LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONAL NATURE OF A
MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA.
Finally, defendant complains that Judge Noel left him
with the false impression that he could withdraw his guilty plea,
by right, within 30 days of entering it.

Defendant's claim must

fail.
Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that the court may not accept a guilty plea until the
court has found that "the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a guilty plea or no
contest."

The rule does not require the court to explain to a

defendant that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be
granted upon a showing of "good cause" under Utah Code Ann. § 7713-6(2)(a) (1990) .
Yet, defendant claims that statements by his counsel,
in conjunction with those of the court, created confusion (Br. of
App. at 21). However, the statements by Judge Noel were quite
clear, carefully couched in words of limitation and permission.
Judge Noel told defendant, "And I will advise you, Mr. Jones,
that if you intend to ask this court to allow you to withdraw
this guilty plea that request must be made within 30 days; do you
understand that?" (Tl. 7) (emphasis added).

Nothing in that

phrase can be construed as telling defendant he has an unlimited
right to withdraw his guilty plea within the 30-day period.
Judge Noel's explanation to defendant complied with Rule 11(5)
that defendant must be informed of the time limits for filing a
motion to withdraw.
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During the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty
pleaf Judge Noel rejected defense counsel's attempt to impose her
misstatements on the court.

During that hearing, the following

discussion ensued:
Ms, Mower (Defense counsel is reading from
the transcript of the guilty plea hearing):
"Miss Mower: Let me remind the Court that we
must advise Mr. Jones about his right to
withdraw his guilty plea. It is good for
only 30 days." The Court then goes through
the affidavit and some of the rights that are
contained in that affidavit, and later on the
Court repeats that statement.
The Court: I don't repeat it in that way. I
specifically stated, page 7, "If you intend
to ask this Court to allow you to withdraw
your guilty plea, then that request must be
made within 30 days."
Ms. Mower: That's correct. And the Court
reinforces that, Yes, we have to advise you
you have 30 days in which to request the
withdrawal.
The Court: That's right, and that's what I'm
bound by law to do.
(T2. 34). Judge Noel denied defendant's motion finding that he
had complied with "all requirements and rules of law" (R. 112)
(See Appendix "B"; Minute Entry); (T2. 48-50) (See Appendix "C";
Transcript Excerpts).
As for defendant's claim that defense counsel

helped

create the confusion, this Court should reject that assertion
under the doctrine of invited error which the Utah Supreme Court
has held "is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor. .
• ."

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 547, 560 (Utah 1987).

As the

Ironically, counsel on appeal was also defense counsel at the
plea hearing and motion to withdraw hearing.
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Supreme Court noted in another case, "To rule otherwise would
permit a defendant in a criminal case to 'invite' prejudicial
error and implant it in the record as a form of appellate
insurance against an adverse sentence,"

State v. Parsons, 781

P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the lower court's order denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be
affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i ^

day of August, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

W\£h

JUDICIAL' DISTRICT'

STATE OF UTAH

OCT 3 1 $ 8

THE STATE OF UTAH,

By

Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

v.
Criminal No.
Defendant.

COMES NOW,

the defendant in this

case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea off (guilty)) \np
(

contest) to the
\

following crimey^S:
CRIME

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT (Min/Max)

B..

c.
D..

I

have

received

a copy of

against me, I have read i t ,

the

(c^arae

and I understand the natu^e""""?^

elements of the o f f e n s e ( W for which I am pleading' ( g u i l t y $10
corniest).

'

u

i > «^ *. *~+ »**-"

The elements of the crimeCf)

of which I am charged are as

follows:

P ) "T>/sr&6i/77J7^

3J o^A- (U/^muA\ bu&<n\^sOf
</) C<£fitsJ£
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I
am criminally

liable, that constitutes

c r i m e ^ charged are as follows:

I am entering

the

elements

of the

£>AJ /)ffl. /^/fft7 -J-

SoLj)

this/the^s^ plea(jjrt
><>2 voluntarily

and with

knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
2.

3^(have not}> (ftay^) waived my right to counsel.

If I

have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,
intelligently

and

voluntarily

because

of

the

following

reasons:

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read

this statement and understand the nature and elements of the
charges, my

rights

in this

and

consequences of my plea of guilty.

_ 1

-

other

proceedings

and

the

4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney
_, and I have had an opportunity to

discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my
guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to
have them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I

have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense
to testify in court upon my behalf.
7.

I know that

I have a right to testify in my own

behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to
testify

or

give

evidence

against

myself

and

no

adverse

inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against

me I need only plead "not guiltyM and the matter will be set
for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving
doubt.

each element

of

the

charge

beyond

a reasonable

If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be

unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or# where allowed, to the Supreme Court of
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such
appeal, those costs would be paid by the state.
10.

I know that the maximum possible sentence may be

imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a

- 3 -

prison term, fine, or both.
fine,

a^S

%

I know that in addition to any

surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated

63-63-9, will be imposed.

I also know that I may be ordered by

the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my
crimes.
11.

I know

that

imprisonment may be for consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to
more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed upon me.
.12.

I know and understand that by pleading /(guilt^ J^np

conifest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights
set out in the preceding paragraphs.

I also know

that by

entering such plea^X) I am admitting and do so admit that I
have committed

the conduct alleged

and I am guilty

of the

crimeuk) for which my pleaQs) ls/3)^ entered.
My plea(& of /(guilty)J ( & 6 6 o h ^ s t )

13.

(Q>iY

n^£ the

result of a plea bargain""b€'€ween myself and the prosecuting
attorney.

The promises, duties and provisions of this plea

bargain, if any,

are fully contained in the Plea Agreement

attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction

of

the

charges

for

sentencing

either defense counsel or the prosecuting
binding

on

the judge.

I also know that

- 4 -

made or sought by
attorney

are not

any opinions they

express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also
not binding on the court.
15.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any

kind have been made to induce me to plead
promises except, those contained

guilty,

and no

herein and in the attached

plea agreement, have been made to me.
16.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to

me by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know

that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
affidavit.

I do not wish to make any changes because all of-

the statements are correct.
17.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
18.

y \

I am

years of age; I have attended school

through the

ade and I can read and understand the

English language.
medication

or

I was not under the influence of any drugs,

intoxicants

plea(V> was made.

when

the

decision

to

enter

the

I am not presently under the influence of

any drugs, medication or intoxicants.
19.

I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning

mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect
or

impairment

that

would

prevent

me

from

knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this i^*~~

dav of

e f e n d a n t T
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^

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for
the defendant

above,

statement

or

that

discussed

it

with

and

that

I have

I know

read

him/hVr

it

and

he/sift* has read the

to

him/het

and

that

he/siW

believe

understands the meaning of its contents and
physically competent.
after

an

I have
fully

is mentally and

To the best of my knowledge and belief

appropriate

investigation,

the

elements

of

the

crimeCsJ) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate^nd /true.

fney/for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against
reviewed

., defendant.

this statement of the defendant

declarations,

including

the

elements

I have

and find that the

of the offense of the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct*

No

improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea
have been offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully

contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement
or

as

supplemented

on

record

before

the

court.

There is

reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction

of

defendant

for

the

offense(s)

for

which

the

- 6 V; is 'w ~l •*-* r

plea(s)

is/are

entered

and

acceptance of the plea(s) would

serve the public interest.

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and

certif ication,

the

court

finds the defendants

plea of

guilty is freely and voluntarily made and j.t is so ordered that
O^c^n^est) to the chargeOsQ

the defendants plea OJ

set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

?

.day of

rA. . 19H

DISTRICT JUDGE
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APPENDIX B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
JONES, DOUGLAS REED

CASE NUMBER 881991656 FS
DATE 12/18/89
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL
COURT REPORTER CREED BARKER
COURT CLERK PAJ

DEFENDANT
JAIL FEDERAL HOLD
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. HUFNAGEL, WENDY
D. ATTY. MOWER, CONNIE

DEFT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA COMES NOW ON
REGUARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING.
DOUGLAS JONES IS SWORN AND EXAMINED IN HIS OWN BEHALF.
THE MOTION IS ARGUED TO THE COURT BY RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND
SUBMITTED.
THE COURT FINDS THAT DEFT'S PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY. ALL REQUIRMENTS AND RULES OF LAW WERE MET. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
DEFT UNDERSTOOD ALL OF HIS RIGHT AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED A PLEA
OF GUILTY. DEFT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IS DENIED.
DEFT'S SENTENCING IS SET FOR JAN. 5, 1990 AT 10:30 A.M.

APPENDIX C

1

THAT SAYS YOU MUST ADVISE THEM OF DEFENSES.

2

IN THERE SAYS THAT.

3

KNOWINGNESS OF THE PLEA, KNOWINGLY ENTERING A PLEA.

4

RIGHT, NOTHING

BUT I THINK IT DOES RELATE TO

COUNSEL ALSO ARGUES THAT WOULD JUST BE TOO

5

ENCUMBERING ON THE COURT TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO TAKE THE

6

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT AT THE TIME THAT HE'S CHANGING HIS

7

PLEA AND EVALUATE THAT STATEMENT ON THE RECORD.

8

CONTRARY, FEDERAL RULE 11 REQUIRES PRECISELY THAT.

9

LITTLE MORE DETAILED.

TO THE
IT'S A

AND WITH THE CHANGE OF PLEAS IN THE

10

FEDERAL COURT EVERY DEFENDANT IS SWORN IN, EVERY DEFENDANT

11

MAKES A STATEMENT ON THE RECORD WHICH IS EVALUATED BY THE

12

COURT AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF THE PLEA.

13

FEDERAL SYSTEM HASN'T COLLAPSED YET.

14

REQUIREMENT OF BEING THAT THOROUGH AT THE TIME OF THE

15

TAKING OF THE PLEA IS NOT GOING TO HARM THE COURT.

16

TAKE A COUPLE MORE MINUTES, BUT I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT AND

17

ESPECIALLY IN A CASE LIKE THIS WHERE THERE WAS AN APPARENT

18

DEFENSE THAT WAS HEARD, AND THERE WAS AN ENTRY OF A PLEA.

19

WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT THE DEFENDANT'S UNDERSTANDING WAS OF

20

THAT DEFENSE, AND WE NEED IT ON THE RECORD AND WE DON'T

21

HAVE IT.

22

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

AND OUR

THAT ADDITIONAL

IT MAY

THE COURT WILL MAKE

23

THESE OBSERVATIONS AND I AM GOING TO RULE ON THIS CASE

24

TODAY.

25

THE COURT NECESSARILY HAS TO TAKE THAT TIME TO ENSURE THAT

REGARDLESS OF THE TIME IT TAKES TO RECEIVE A PLEA,

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

1

IT'S BEEN DONE VOLUNTARILY.

2

QUESTION ABOUT THAT.

3

THAT, AND IT'S TOLD US TO TAKE THE TIME.

4

I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY

THE SUPREME COURT IS SENSITIVE TO

IN THIS CASE, THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT THE

5

PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY.

IN ORDER TO DETERMINE VOLUNTARINESS,

6

THE COURT HAS TO OBVIOUSLY QUESTION THE DEFENDANT.

7

IT'S TOO EASY IN MY MIND FOR A DEFENDANT TO COME BACK LATER

8

AND SAY SUBJECTIVELY:

9

UNDERSTAND THAT.

BUT

I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THIS OR DIDN'T

THE COURT HAS TO LOOK AT THE RECORD,

10

TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND MAKE SURE ALL OF THE

11

REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW ARE MET, AND THEN MAKE A FINDING.

12

THE COURT MADE THAT FINDING THAT THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY.

13

THINK ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES WERE

14

MET.

15

ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE BE DISCUSSED.

16

APPELLATE COURT FEELS IT SHOULD HAVE HKKN THEN THEY CAN SO

17

INDICATE, IF THIS MATTER IS APPEALED.

18

THIS POINT THAT IS A NECESSARY REQUIREMENT.

19

CONVINCED THEN AND IS CONVINCED NOW IT WAS VOLUNTARILY

20

ENTERED.

21

I

I DON'T THINK THAT THE RULES REQUIRE THAT THE
I SUPPOSE IF THE

BUT I DON'T THINK AT
THE COURT WAS

THERE'S THE QUESTJ ON ABOUT THE 30 DAY

22

WITHDRAWAL PROVISION.

THE COURT JUST FEELS IT IS NOT

23

BELIEVABLE THAT MR. JONES WOULD FEEL THAT WHAT WE WENT

24

THROUGH AT THE TIME OF THE RECEIVING OF THE PLEA DIDN'T

25

MEAN ANYTHING, IN THAT SIMPLY IF HE GOT BUYER'S REMORSE HE

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

1

COULD CHANGE HIS MIND AND COME BACK WITHIN 30 DAYS. AND

2

THE COURT SAID HE COULD REQUEST THAT THE COURT ALLOW HIS

3

GUILTY PLEA BE WITHDRAWN AND I SPECIFICALLY WORDED IT THAT

4

WAY.

5

HIS GUILTY PLEA.

6

TO ALLOW HIM TO DO IT, HE HAS TO MAKE THE REQUEST.

7

I SAY, I'M GOING TO FIND ~

8

EVIDENCE HERE TODAY AND THE COURT NEEDS TO MAKE A FINDING.

9

I NEVER TELL A DEFENDANT HE HAS A RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
BUT THEN IF HE IS GOING TO ASK THE COURT
AND AS

I THINK THAT THERE WAS SOME

THE COURT IS GOING TO FIND NOW AS IT DID AT THE

10

TIME THE PLEA WAS ENTERED, THAT THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY AND

11

THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS.

12

VIOLATION YOU MENTIONED WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHT TO

13

CROSS-EXAMINATION, ALL OF HIS RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

14

WERE STATED, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION, THERE

15

MAY BE SOME VERY TECHNICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONFRONTATION

16

AND CROSS-EXAMINATION, BUT I THINK THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE

17

LAW WERE MET IN THIS REGARD IN ADVISING HIM OF HIS

18

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

19

I THINK HE VOLUNTARY ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY.

20

CHANGED HIS MIND NOW AND THINKS HE MAY HAVE A BETTER CASE

21

NOW, THE LAW DOESN'T REQUIRE THAT HIS PLEA BE WITHDRAW

22

BECAUSE HE HAS A BETTER CASE NOW THAN HE DID THEN.

23

WILL DENY YOUR MOTION.

24

MS. MOWER:

25

THE TECHNICAL

AND I THINK HE UNDERSTOOD THOSE AND

THANK YOU.

IF HE'S

SO 1

MAY WE HAVE FINDINGS OF

FACT, PLEASE?
CREED H. BARKER, CSR

